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Abstract 
 
Empirical results through a fixed effects regression model show that 
government size has a negative effect on growth mainly through hampering capital 
accumulation. When a sample is divided into OECD and non-OECD countries, the 
negative effect of government size on capital accumulation persists for non-OECD 
countries but not for OECD countries.  
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1. Introduction 
Government failure is thought to have a negative effect on economic growth. If 
resources were allocated less efficiently by larger governments, economic growth would 
be hindered. This conjecture is supported by several existing works (e.g., Landau, 1985; 
Peden & Bradley, 1989; Fölster & Herekson, 2001). On the other hand, some studies do 
not find an obvious association between government size and economic growth (e.g., 
Ram, 1986; Bairam, 1990; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Mendoza et al., 1997). There is 
also argument that the relationship between government size and growth is non-linear 
(Barro 1997; Grossman, 1988; Chen & Lee, 2005). However, government size influences 
growth through some channels, but previous studies pay little attention to it. For closer 
examination, it is necessary to examine through which channels government size affects 
growth.  
To analyze the channels of economic growth Kumar and Russell (2002) used data 
envelopment analysis (hereafter, DEA) to construct the world production frontier and 
decomposed labor-productivity growth into three components: technological catch-up, 
capital deepening, and technological change. Furthermore, through regression analysis, 
they examined how the initial output per worker affects these components. In that study, 
it was found that capital accumulation contributed the most to growth, rather than 
technological change or catch-up.  
This paper aims to improve the above method and apply it to an investigation of 
the influence of government size on growth in an attempt to produce new empirical 
evidence1. The main findings of the estimation indicate that government size hampers 
economic growth mainly by impeding capital accumulation in developing but not in 
                                                   
1 Yamamura and Shin (2008) applied the same method to analyze the long-term 
economic growth in Japan.  
developed countries.  
 
2. Data and Model  
By using DEA, Kumar and Russell (2002) constructed a cross-country data set 
by decomposing labor-productivity growth into three components. They conducted a 
simple OLS regression model where the independent variables were the output per 
worker in 1965; while the dependent variables were the percentage change between 
1965 and 1990 for output per worker, technological change, the efficiency index, and the 
capital accumulation index. In their estimation, unobservable individual and time 
effects were ignored. This leads to estimation bias.  
Following Kumar and Russell (2002), this paper uses DEA to construct a panel 
dataset spanning the years 1965 to 1990 for 57 countries2. Second, using this dataset I 
use fixed effects estimation to reduce omitted variable bias caused by time invariant 
features of the country. I also incorporate year dummies into this model to capture 
individually invariant time specific effects3. The estimated function takes the following 
form: 
GriT-to = 1 Ln(Output) it0 +Ln(Government size) it0 +Ln(Openness) it0 + ti   +uit ,  
where GriT-to represents labor-productivity growth and the change in any of the three 
dependent variables (i.e., Efficiency, capital, and Technique) in country i from each base 
year t0 to year T ( t0 = 1965, …, 1989 and T = 1966, …, 1990, respectively). ’s represent 
regression parameters,   is the time-invariant individual effect of each country,   
                                                   
2 Kumar and Russell (2002) admitted that their method includes the possibility of an 
implosion of the technological frontier. Henderson and Russell (2005) precluded an 
implosion of the frontier over time. In this paper, it is also precluded.  
3 This estimator is identical to that of a two-way fixed effects estimator (Baltagi, 2005; 
Ch. 3). 
represents the year specific effects, and u is an error term. As stated earlier,  and   
are controlled. All independent variables are the values in the base year t0 and take 
log-form. I incorporate the level of the per capita GDP in t0 to control the initial level of 
productivity. Openness is measured by exports plus imports divided by GDP (the total 
trade as a percentage of GDP). These data are collected from the Penn World Table (pwt 
6.3) 4 . Government size is measured by general government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP) gathered from the World Bank (2006)5.  
 
3. Results 
The estimation results of the fixed effects model with year dummy variables from 
1966 to 1990 are reported in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3. All countries are included in 
Table 1. OECD and non-OECD samples are used in the estimations found in Tables 2 
and 3. In each table, the results of the dependent variables of output per capita change 
are shown in column (1). The results of the efficiency change, capital accumulation, and 
technological progress are exhibited in columns (2), (3) and (4)6.  
Table 1 shows that government size takes a significant negative sign in columns (1) 
and (3). This shows that government size hinders economic growth mainly through 
hampering capital accumulation. On the other hand, openness values are positive and 
are statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1), (2) and (4). Hence, the degree 
                                                   
4 The data are available from Center of International Comparisons at the University of 
Pennsylvania. http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ (accessed May 1, 2007).  
5 Other key variables such as social trust, corruption, and human capital determine the 
dependent variables. If these variables are included, observations are excluded from the 
sample because I cannot obtain these variables from some countries. Hence, I do not 
incorporate these variables from the sample in order to maintain a large sample size.  
6 Yamamura and Shin (2007) used the same data set to conduct the same estimation 
method even though government size and openness were not included as independent 
variables. The results for per capita GDP are almost the same as those exhibited in 
Yamamura and Shin (2007). 
of international trade leads to economic growth through efficiency improvement and 
progress of technology. Turning to Table 2, both government size and openness are 
positive but statistically insignificant in column (1), suggesting that they do not 
influence the economic growth in the developed countries such as OECD member 
countries. 
 Contrary to the results for OECD countries, the results for non-OECD countries in 
Table 3 show that the coefficient of government size is significantly negative and the 
coefficient of openness is significantly positive in column (1). Furthermore, it is 
interesting to observe that government size is negative and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level in column (3) and that openness is positive and is significant at the 1% 
level in column (2). From Table 3, I conclude that openness improves efficiency and 
hence becomes an engine of economic growth. On the other hand, government size 
impedes capital accumulation and therefore hampers economic growth in non-OECD 
countries.  
I interpret the evidence presented above to mean that increase in the government 
sector crowds out private investment, resulting in a reduction of capital accumulation. 
This tendency is especially noticeable in developing countries, but not in developed 
countries. This might be because people can more easily access official information such 
as government expenditure in developed countries than they can in developing 
countries. As a result of this information asymmetry, governments of developing 
countries can easily manipulate information concerning their expenditure. Accordingly, 
effective investment by the private sector would be crowded out.  
 
4. Conclusions 
This study uses panel data from 57 countries during the period 1965-1989 to 
examine how government size influences economic growth, and decomposes the effect of 
government size. Using a fixed effects regression model with year dummies, I found 
that government size has a negative effect on growth, mainly through hampering 
capital accumulation. But when considering OECD and non-OECD countries separately, 
the negative effect of government size on capital accumulation persists for non-OECD 
countries but not for OECD countries. I infer that the public sector crowds out private 
sector investment for developing countries and economic growth is thereby impeded. 
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 Table 1 Fixed effects estimates for all countries (1965-1989). 
 
Note: Not reported here, year dummies are included in all estimations as independent 
variables. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Growth 
 
(1) 
Efficiency 
improvement 
   (2) 
Capital 
accumulation 
(3) 
Technological 
progress 
(4) 
Ln(Output) -0.069*** 
  (-6.48)- 
-0.08*** 
  (-8.28)- 
0.018*** 
  (5.51)- 
0.002 
  (0.86)- 
Ln(Government 
size) 
-0.020** 
(-2.30) 
-0.004 
(-0.52) 
-0.012*** 
(-4.52) 
-0.003 
(-1.30) 
Ln(Openness) 
 
0.047*** 
(6.26) 
0.03*** 
(5.28) 
0.001 
(0.79) 
0.005*** 
(2.61) 
Groups 57 57 57 57 
Samples 1362 1362 1362 1362 
 Table 2 Fixed effects estimates for OECD countries (1965-1989). 
Note: Not reported here, year dummies are included in all estimations as independent 
variables. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Growth 
 
(1) 
Efficiency 
improvement 
   (2) 
Capital 
accumulation 
(3) 
Technological 
progress 
(4) 
Ln(Output) -0.103*** 
  (-6.92)- 
-0.045*** 
  (-2.96)- 
-0.027*** 
  (-5.85)- 
-0.027*** 
  (-5.37)- 
Ln(Government 
size) 
0.002 
(0.13) 
0.004 
(0.31) 
-0.002 
(-0.44) 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
Ln(Openness) 
 
0.015 
(1.32) 
0.057*** 
(4.86) 
-0.040*** 
(-11.3) 
-0.001 
(-0.43) 
Groups 24 24 24 24 
Samples 585 585 585 585 
 Table 3 Fixed effects estimates for non-OECD countries (1965-1989). 
Note: Not reported here, year dummies are included in all estimations as independent 
variables. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Growth 
 
(1) 
Efficiency 
improvement 
   (2) 
Capital 
accumulation 
(3) 
Technological 
progress 
(4) 
Ln(Output) -0.067*** 
  (-4.57)- 
 -0.093*** 
 (-6.37)- 
0.022*** 
 (5.23) 
0.005 
(1.60)- 
Ln(Government 
size) 
 
-0.029** 
(-2.45) 
-0.003 
(-0.31) 
-0.017*** 
(-5.22) 
-0.007** 
(-2.48) 
Ln(Openness) 
 
0.043*** 
(3.83) 
0.042*** 
(3.75) 
0.001 
(0.38) 
-0.0007 
(-0.29) 
Groups 57 57 57 57 
Samples 1362 1362 1362 1362 
